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The Ontology of Organismic Agency:
A Kantian Approach
Abstract: Biologists explain organisms’ behavior not only as having been pro-
grammed by genes and shaped by natural selection, but also as the result of
an organism’s agency: the capacity to react to environmental changes in goal-
driven ways. The use of such ‘agential explanations’ reopens old questions
about how justified it is to ascribe agency to entities like bacteria or plants
that obviously lack rationality and even a nervous system. Is organismic agency
genuinely ‘real’ or is it just a useful fiction? In this paper we focus on two ques-
tions: whether agential explanations are to be interpreted ontically, and whether
they can be reduced to non-agential explanations (thereby dispensing with
agency). The Kantian approach we identify interprets agential explanations
non-ontically, yet holds agency to be indispensable. Attributing agency to organ-
isms is not to be taken literally in the way we attribute physical properties such
as mass or acceleration, but nor is it a mere heuristic or predictive tool. Rather, it
is an inevitable consequence of our own rational capacity: as long as we are ra-
tional agents ourselves, we cannot avoid seeing agency in organisms.
Introduction
Stags lock antlers to gain access to mates. Arctic poppies rotate and track the sun
in order to maximize solar exposure. Bacteria swim up a sucrose gradient in
order to get better access to the source of sucrose.When biologists explain organ-
isms’ behavior by referring to their goals in this way, then they are using what we
in this paper will call agency explanations. Such explanations make sense of or-
ganisms’ behavior as if they were agents with goals.
Despite its philosophical pedigree (going back in some form to Aristotle), the
problem of organismic agency was neglected in much of twentieth century phi-
losophy of biology and mainstream evolutionary theory, which was dominated
by the artifact approach to organisms. The organism was understood to be a col-
lection of functional traits, designed by natural selection in much the same way
Paley’s watch was designed by an intentional creator. Thus, each pattern of ap-
parently purposive behavior was understood to be a functional trait that is pur-
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posive in name only (‘teleonomy’, cf. Pittendrigh 1958; Ernst Mayr 1961). In phi-
losophy of biology this view was enshrined by the ‘selected effects’ account of
function, where all biological functions can be explained by a process of natural
selection (Wright 1973, 1976; Millikan 1984; Neander 1991).
In recent decades a more robust approach to organismic agency, which we
will call the agential approach, has become increasingly influential. Organisms
are agents with goals and purposes that interact with their environments, and
their behavior can only be understood with reference to the goals of organisms
as wholes rather than as mere collections of parts (e.g., genes or traits). This
focus on whole organisms (following Bateson 2005) is linked with several ongo-
ing developments in evolutionary biology, most notably the so-called Extended
Synthesis (e.g. Müller 2017).
This motivates taking a new look at the long-standing question whether or
not organismic agency is ‘real’, in the same way that the wings of a bird are,
or the claws of a bear. After all, agency ascriptions to organisms have long
been suspected of being mere metaphors and fictions of the human mind –
an anthropomorphic projection even – rather than an accurate description of
the mind-independent world. We call this question the question of whether to
adopt an ontic view of agential explanations (cf. Salmon 1989). In an ontic
view of agential explanation, agential explanations explain because they refer
to an element of the ontology of the world (i.e., agency) which is responsible
for the explanandum (i.e., organismic behavior) – just in the same way that
causal-mechanical explanations explain because they single out the actual
mechanism that causes the explanandum phenomenon (Craver 2014).
Our approach in this paper will be to overlay this question with a distinct but
closely related one: whether agential explanations ultimately can be reduced to
non-agential explanations (a worry raised in e.g., Lewens 2007). For instance,
once one asks the question why organisms have such-and-such purposes and
not others in the first place, the agential approach rapidly becomes inadequate.
Why do stags want access to mates in the first place? The most plausible expla-
nation would seem to involve a selection explanation, along the lines of ‘those
stags who tended to not engage in sexual competition did not get to transmit
their genes to the next generation’. Thus, the genesis of organismic purposes
is explained through a process of natural selection. However, does this also
imply that purposeful behavior can be explained without reference to organismic
purpose or agency, without loss of explanatory power? We call this question the
question of explanatory dispensability. Agency is (explanatorily) dispensable if
and only if an agential explanation can be replaced by an explanation void of
any reference to organismic agency or purposes, without any loss of explanatory
power.
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Even though there are four possible combinations of answers to these two
questions, most contemporary thinking about agential explanation focuses on
two. The first is the non-ontic (epistemic) view of agential explanation where
agency is dispensable. Its main representative today is what we call the ‘Neo-
Fisherian option’, which holds that agency is invoked in explaining behavior
for purely heuristic reasons – in particular, as shorthand for other types of expla-
nation (especially selectionist explanation). This option has been especially
widely adopted in behavioral ecology where, following Grafen’s ‘maximizing
agent analogy’ (Grafen 1984), organisms’ behavior is analyzed as maximizing in-
clusive fitness (Grafen 2006).¹ The Neo-Fisherian option can be traced back to
Fisher’s fundamental theorem of natural selection, which states that, under
the influence of natural selection, populations of organisms have a tendency
to increase fitness (equal to the population’s genetic variance in fitness: cf. Fish-
er 1930, chapter 2). In this way, agential explanations could be adequately re-
placed by explanations that do not refer to organismic agency and purposes
(but only to natural selection), and organismic agency therefore is not a mind-
independent causal power in the way, for instance, natural selection is assumed
to be.
The second option, decidedly less mainstream but increasingly defended,
combines indispensability with an ontic view of agential explanation. We call
this the ‘Neo-Aristotelian option’, since it expands fundamental ontology to in-
clude organismic purposes. Different versions of this option have been devel-
oped in recent years: most prominently by Walsh (Walsh 2012, 2015), but Moreno
and Mossio’s analysis of biological autonomy also follows the Neo-Aristotelian
option (Moreno and Mossio 2015), as does Varela’s notion of autopoiesis (Varela
1979).
In this paper we seek to identify a third option² which we call the ‘Kantian
option’ regarding agential explanations: (1) the concept of organismic agency is
indispensable to scientific explanation and (2) agential explanations are to be
conceived non-ontically³. In particular, viewing organisms as agents with pur-
 Inclusive fitness is a fitness measure that includes the (expectation of the) number of kin off-
spring (so a sterile individual could have a high inclusive fitness if its relatives had many off-
spring), mitigated by the degree of genetic relatedness between relatives; for this latter reason,
the maximizing analogy forms a bridge between behavioral ecology and population genetics.
 The fourth option – where agency is explanatorily dispensable and yet considered robustly
real – is possible but does not strike us as particularly compelling. After all, if a concept is dis-
pensable, Ockham’s razor directs us to discard it from our ontology.
 To what extent ‘non-ontic’ should be interpreted as ‘epistemic’ sensu Salmon (1989) is a
rather complicated question which we discuss at the end of section 5.
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poses is a “demand of reason”: it is necessary given our rational nature. This
means that attributing agency is not a consequence of our limited computational
capacity, or of our contingent evolved nature that causes us to detect agency
falsely (cf. the so-called ‘agency detection’ cognitive modules: Atran 2002; Bar-
rett 2000). Yet at the same time, it is a mistake to believe that agency is a natural
regularity or causal process, belonging to the ‘furniture’ of the world in the same
sense as physical processes. In this way we will suggest how one can obtain the
robust explanatory indispensability desired by (some) Neo-Aristotelians (i.e.,
agency is not just a heuristic) without the ontological price that Neo-Fisherians
would be loath to pay.
The paper is structured as follows: in the first section we give a broad intro-
duction to organisms and the major streams in biological thought, written for
non-specialists (i.e., philosophers outside the philosophy of biology). In the sec-
ond section we define with more precision what an agential explanation is and
contrast it with functional explanations. In the third we discuss various at-
tempts to replace agential explanations with non-agential explanations, and
argue that – despite widespread hopes – once one looks at the details, one can-
not but conclude that attempts to make agency dispensable, even today, remain
aspirational rather than clearly successful. In the fourth section we discuss
Kant’s original approach to teleology in the natural world and show how it
can be the basis for our Kantian approach to agency. In the final section we
show how the Kantian approach entails viewing agential explanations as a ‘de-
mand of reason’.
1 Artifacts and Agents
Much of mainstream twentieth-century evolutionary biology operated within
the framework of what is called ‘the Modern Synthesis’, a term coined by Julian
Huxley (Huxley [1942] 1974). The Modern Synthesis was forged in the 1930s and
1940s by Ronald Fisher, Sewall Wright, Theodosius Dobzhansky, and John Hal-
dane, among others, and is often described as the synthesis of Mendelian genet-
ics and Darwin’s theory of natural selection. It was very much focused on how
allele (different versions of the same gene) frequencies change over time in re-
sponse to evolutionary forces, such as natural selection, mutation, drift, or mi-
gration.
Organisms were essentially analyzed as epiphenomena arising from changes
in underlying allele frequencies. In the words of Huxley ([1942] 1974), they were
viewed as “bundles of adaptations” where each adaptive trait was shaped by
natural selection in response to environmental demands – just as artifacts are
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designed and put together, piece by piece, by an artisan. Such a view of organ-
isms has never been unanimously accepted, even among the major architects of
the Modern Synthesis (cf. Mayr 1982; Simpson 1944, 1953), but the view has
nonetheless been the dominant one, and has been popularized in the work of
Richard Dawkins (Dawkins 1976). Dawkins introduced a dichotomy between rep-
licators (alleles) and interactors (organisms), with the consequence that organ-
isms are mere tools in a never-ending arms race between genes, with genes
the genuine actors in evolutionary history. Even apparently goal-directed organ-
ismic behaviors, such as beavers building dams, are expressions (‘extended phe-
notypes’) of the underlying genotype (Dawkins 1982). In sum, while it may seem
that an organism undertakes behavior to further its own goals (e.g., secure food,
fend off predators, etc.), it does so actually for the benefit of the genes, which get
to replicate when the organism does well. In this way, the theoretical resources of
the Modern Synthesis were used to support a philosophical view of agency as
dispensable and fictional.
The metaphor of Paley’s watch, which dominated in the early days of the
Modern Synthesis,⁴ was supplemented after the 1960s with analogies borrowed
from computer science. Organismic behavior was often described as program-
med, starting with influential papers by Mayr (1961) and Jacob and Monod (1961):
The purposive action of an individual, insofar as it is based on the properties of its genetic
code, therefore is no more nor less purposive than the actions of a computer that has been
programmed to respond appropriately to various inputs. (Mayr 1961, 1504, our emphasis)
So even if the behavior of an organism may seem goal-directed, that is only be-
cause its genetic code has been ‘programmed’ by natural selection to direct the
organism to react in certain ways to certain inputs, and in other ways to other
inputs. Organisms are no more goal-directed than computers are.
Despite the metaphors of ‘design’ and ‘program,’ it is important to note that
even biologists operating squarely within the Modern Synthesis were well aware
of the limits of the metaphors. In the quote above, Mayr qualified the program-
ming analogy with “insofar as it is based on the properties of its genetic code.”
Mayr is not claiming that individual organisms behave exactly like pre-program-
med computers, only that some aspects of their behavior are determined by en-
vironmental inputs in the way that a computer program responds to user inputs.
Similarly, in The Extended Phenotype, Dawkins devotes a whole chapter to de-
bunking the view that genes determine all aspects of organismic behavior, a
view he calls the ‘myth’ of genetic determinism.
 Cf. Lewens 2005 for an in-depth discussion of the artifact metaphor.
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The limitations of the artifact metaphor are built into one of the very foun-
dations of the Modern Synthesis: the analysis of phenotypic variance as pro-
posed by Fisher (Fisher 1919). This analysis states that, in general, only a part
of the variation of phenotypes in a population is explained by a corresponding
variation in genotype. The rest is variation in environment (impacting how the
organism develops), or variation in how genotype and environment correlate
(cf. e.g. Hamilton 2009).
Thus, no practicing biologist holds that organismic behavior (or phenotype)
is entirely determined by a genetic program⁵, for the very simple reason that the
environment is the second element that goes into determining phenotype.
The role of the environment points to limitations in speaking about the
adaptive ‘design’ of organisms. A genotype may be designed for a particular
type of environment, i.e., there may be a particular ‘normal’ environment in
which the bulk of the selection for that genotype occurred. In that normal envi-
ronment, the genotype develops into an adaptive phenotype. However, in reality,
environments are highly heterogeneous, so in a population of identical geno-
types, only a fraction will develop in the ‘normal’ environment. Other environ-
mental inputs – inputs that differ from the normal environment – cause the or-
ganism to diverge from its ‘designed’ phenotype. In this way, while theoretical
resources in the Modern Synthesis lend some support to the artifact metaphor,
the same resources point also to the metaphor’s limitations.
Moreover, the role of environment in organismic behavior (and phenotype
more generally) also provides a direct motivation for the agential approach. To
see this in more detail, consider the phenomenon of phenotypic plasticity. A
trait is ‘plastic’ (in the context of quantitative genetics⁶) when the underlying
genotype can develop into different phenotypes solely due to environmental var-
iation. The degree of plasticity of a trait is represented by the term VE in the equa-
tion above.⁷ Plasticity, defined in this way, is an incredibly basic phenomenon: it
simply refers to how different environments cause genotypes to develop into dif-
ferent phenotypes. At its most basic, it can refer to phenomena that are the result
of physical or chemical (rather than properly biological) processes, such as the
stunting in the growth of a plant in response to poor nutrition. There are few if
 Whether organismic behavior can be entirely explained by natural selection is a more difficult
question, since the environment also can be influenced by natural selection through niche con-
struction. We discuss this in Section 3.
 There is also cell plasticity, referring to the multiple dispositions of a totipotent cell in devel-
opmental theory. This is not relevant here.
 The term describes how different genotypes are correlated with different degrees of plasticity;
or in other words, how different genotypes react differently to environmental novelty.
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any organisms that lack some form of phenotypic plasticity in some of their
traits.
The phenomenon of plasticity was not considered to be of any special signif-
icance until the work of Bradshaw (Bradshaw 1965); before him, the phenotypic
variation due to environmental perturbation was often viewed as noise. Brad-
shaw showed that plasticity in a trait can be adaptive to heterogeneous environ-
ments. If an organism can vary a trait in response to changes in its environ-
ment so as to be able to adopt a more adaptive phenotype, such an organism
can be at a selective advantage in variable environments, compared to an organ-
ism without that capacity. In particular, Bradshaw distinguished between four
types of environmental heterogeneity where plasticity can be adaptive⁸ (Brad-
shaw 1965, 21): (1) when the environment changes on a time-scale that is
equal to or shorter than generation time; (2) when the environment varies over
very short spatial scales; (3) when the magnitude of environmental variation is
very large; (4) when it is beneficial to maintain a stable phenotype in a popula-
tion while maintaining genetic diversity.
Adaptive scenario (4) shows how maintaining stable phenotypes in the face
of environmental change is also a form of plasticity. When it becomes inscribed
into developmental pathways, it has been termed ‘canalization’ (Waddington
1940); moreover, plastic maintenance of stable phenotypes is hypothesized to
precede genetic accommodation where the phenotype is produced by genetically
determined developmental pathways (West-Eberhard 1989). Finally, some degree
of canalization in organismic traits is nearly ubiquitous, since thermodynamic
fluctuations in the molecular bases of genes would be detrimental and then
counter-selected if they were significantly affecting the development of pheno-
types.
Adaptive scenarios (1)-(3) refer to organismic behavior that is often thought
of as (apparently) agential. For instance, in response to chemical cues emitted
by sea slugs, bryozoans will develop spines to defend themselves (Godfrey-
Smith 1996). Such forms of plasticity open up parallels with cognition, and
not surprisingly, theorists and philosophers concerned with the evolution of cog-
nition often take the evolution of adaptive phenotypic plasticity to be a model
(van Duijn, Keijzer, and Franken 2006; Lyon 2017; Calvo Garzón and Keijzer
2011; Sterelny 2000; Caporael, Griesemer, and Wimsatt 2013; Godfrey-Smith
1996). Organisms exhibit a whole range of cognitive, or at least apparently cog-
 See also Nicoglou (2015) for the history of Bradshaw’s study, and Desmond (2018) for a more
detailed discussion of the role of temporal and spatial scale.
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nitive⁹, behaviors: they sense changes in the environment, are able to process
this information and select a response from a repertoire of responses. Far from
being a late-stage development in evolutionary history, we see these types of be-
haviors in bacteria,which can undertake evasive action upon detecting predators
(Pérez et al. 2016), or swim to a food source upon detecting sucrose gradients
(Auletta 2013).
In sum, the impact of the environment on phenotype shows – via the phe-
nomenon of phenotypic plasticity – how it is not entirely adequate to view or-
ganisms simply as artifacts. Moreover, it motivates a definition of organismic
agency as the capacity to respond to changes in the environment in such a
way as to further organismic purposes. Organismic agency thus understood is
a much broader concept than the agency traditionally ascribed to human, ration-
al subjects, which is typically characterized by means of some mental state, like
an intention (cf. Schlosser 2015). The approach to organismic agency in the bio-
logical sciences, by contrast, blackboxes whatever cognitive processing may or
may not be going on. In this sense organismic agency is best understood as
an ecological property (cf.Walsh 2015), namely, a property of the interaction be-
tween organism and environment. We will now discuss agency and agential ex-
planations in more systematic detail.
2 Agential Explanations
Definition of Agency
For the purposes of this paper, we will operate with the following minimal work-
ing definition of agency:
A system is an agent if and only if (1) it possesses a certain purpose P, where
P is a particular state of the system, (2) it maximizes the realization of P in re-
sponse to environmental change, and (3) the system itself is a cause of the real-
ization of P.
While we view this definition as being continuous with established work in
this area (cf. Moreno and Mossio 2015, 92–93), it may be helpful to explain the
various elements involved in the definition. Condition (1) models the purpose of
a system as a particular state. For organisms, purposes may refer to developmen-
tal states, physiological states, or behavioral states. Condition (2) specifies that
 The application of the term cognition, as well as other terms such as communication or mem-
ory, to organisms such as bacteria remains a controversial point. See discussion in Lyon 2015.
40 Hugh Desmond, Philippe Huneman
goal-directedness is to be interpreted as a maximization or optimization. This
equation of purposefulness with some type of optimization is common across
the sciences. Finally, condition (3) is intended to exclude clear non-agent sys-
tems, even where a process of maximization is occurring, such as the marble roll-
ing down into the middle of the bowl (minimizing gravitational potential ener-
gy). Here the marble is not considered a cause of its own maximization
behavior. The same is true of more complex physical systems, such as Bénard
convection cells, which are patterns of heat flow that appear spontaneously
when the temperature gradient is large enough. Such structures may maintain
their organization even in the face of perturbation in their environment, such
as movement of the container walls (Manneville 2006); nonetheless, they are
widely considered not to be agents (Moreno and Mossio 2015). By contrast, an
organism that modifies its phenotype in order to be more adaptive to a new en-
vironment is considered to be a cause of the modification of its own phenotype.
While ‘self-causation’ can function as a label to distinguish agents from com-
plex physical systems, it remains controversial as to what precisely self-causa-
tion means and how the boundary should be drawn (or, how blurry the boun-
dary is). For instance, it has been (controversially) argued that self-propelling
oil droplets are agents (Hanczyc and Ikegami 2010). Consequently, many rival ac-
counts of self-causation have been given, pointing to various factors such as in-
ternal organization, or control of environmental constraints (Moreno and Mossio
2015; Barandiaran, Di Paolo, and Rohde 2009; Skewes and Hooker 2009; Shani
2013; Burge 2009; Horibe, Hanczyc, and Ikegami 2011).¹⁰ For the purposes of this
paper we do not take a stance on how self-causation should be analyzed; what
will be of importance is how it should be interpreted (i.e., whether it refers to an
ontic causal process, or is a convenient heuristic).
Definition of Agential Explanation
With this operational definition of agency in place, we can introduce ‘agential
explanations’ as scientific explanations that explain in virtue of reference to a
system’s agency:
 The literature on naturalized agency is interdisciplinary to a high degree, with contributors
coming from backgrounds ranging from biology or nonlinear physics to artificial intelligence,
robotics, or cybernetics. A systematization of all the various contributions and approaches is
still lacking.
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Explanandum: In response to environmental change E1 → E2, the system
undergoes the change S1 → S2.
Explanans: (1) The system has purpose P,
(2) S2maximizes the realization of purpose P in environment
E2,
(3) the system itself is a cause of the realization of P.
An agential explanation is a type of ‘extremal explanation’, where the explanan-
dum is explained as some extremal state of affairs maximizing some scalar var-
iable w,¹¹, given certain conditions (i.e., the purpose of the system). As we will
discuss later, an important class of extremal explanations, commonly used in
physics, explains the explanandum as a mathematical consequence of the struc-
tural set-up of the system S (this typically involves various parameters pi).¹² By
contrast, an agential explanation involves a reference to ‘self-causation’, where
the realization of the purpose is ‘caused’ by the system S itself.
Contrast with Functional Explanation
When it comes to the use of teleological language in biology, the philosophy of
science has been overwhelmingly focused on functional statements and func-
tional explanations, e.g., “the heartbeat in vertebrates has the function of circu-
lating blood through the organism” (Hempel 1959). Insofar as a behavior is sim-
ply an organismic trait, can one not just say that the purpose is the ‘function’ of
purposeful behavior – thus reducing agential explanations to special cases of
functional explanations?
This is not quite correct. Ascribing agency to an organism involves a different
type of teleological statement than ascribing a function. The main difference be-
tween functional and agential explanations is that functional explanations at-
tribute a purpose (function) to a trait of an organism, whereas agential explana-
tions attribute a purpose to the whole organism. Functions are attributed to traits
of organisms, whereas agency is attributed to the organisms themselves.
Nonetheless, agential and functional explanations can interact in subtle
ways. For instance, a case could be made that philosophical accounts of func-
tional explanations often presuppose it is possible to ascribe purposes to the
 Some of the most frequently used variables include potential energy, entropy, free energy,
fitness, utility.
 See also Birch (2012) for a compatible account of what he calls ‘agent-talk’ in terms of robust-
ness and stable states.
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whole organism. So, for example, the causal role account of functions (roughly)
holds that a function is what contributes to some ‘capacity’ of a larger complex
system that contains it (Cummins 1975); however, how should such a ‘capacity’
be analyzed if not as a property of the system as a whole? Similarly, the recent
organizational account (Mossio, Saborido, and Moreno 2009) uses organism-
level goals that can be used to ground trait-level functions.¹³
Potentially, a similar point could be made about the selected effects account,
which holds that a function is what explains why some structure was selected for
in the past (Wright 1973, 1976; Millikan 1984; Neander 1991). The selected effects
account presupposes there was some ‘normal environment’ in the evolutionary
past, and while this seems like a good presupposition for structures like the
heart or lungs, it is much less clear what the ‘normal environment’ of certain
types of animal behavior should be. Since this point relates to the dispensability
of agency, we will come back to this line of thought in the next section.
Agential Explanations in Social and Cognitive Sciences
In principle, agential explanations, as defined above, can also be extended to
rational agents, where the purpose is defined as value or a general utility mea-
sure. Such explanations, commonplace in economics, often (and controversially)
assume that economic actors are utility-maximizing agents (which is of course
unrealistic, cf. Tversky and Kahneman 1974). There is a deep parallelism here be-
tween economics and behavioral ecology, noticed by Maynard-Smith in his semi-
nal book on evolutionary game theory when he says that selection is to fitness
what rationality is to economics, both being about maximization (whether of
utility or fitness). This parallel also underlies formal approaches to behavioral
ecology (Grafen 1984, 2014), where organisms maximize fitness in the same
way rational agents maximize utility.
But the parallelism between economics and evolutionary biology goes deep-
er than fitness- or utility-maximization. The apparently irrational behavior diag-
nosed by research following Kahneman and Tverky’s seminal insight on biases
can be accounted for when one takes an ecological perspective. Here, consider-
ing that human agents have been shaped by evolution, and that their decision-
making modules or protocols evolved in environments where information was
partial and decision time was very short (due to predators, competitors etc.),
then crude cognitive biases that yield a utility-enhancing solution most of the
 For a critique, see Huneman (2019).
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time would have been selected. This is what Gigerenzer calls ‘ecological ration-
ality’ (Gigerenzer 2000), which gives rise to a bounded rationality, which in turn
refers to how apparently irrational biases can originate as heuristics that actually
are, on average, utility-maximizing given constraints (limited information and
time). Thus, adopting an evolutionary viewpoint allows many instances of appa-
rently irrational behavior to be analyzed as (boundedly) rational. All these par-
allels between economics and evolution by natural selection give rise to a notion
of ‘agency’ that has recently been systematically explored (in Okasha 2018).
3 The Ontology and Dispensability of Agency
Should Agential Explanation Be Viewed Ontically?
With this systematization in place, we can now consider in some more detail the
question whether the explanatory relation is to be interpreted as ontic or merely
epistemic, i.e., whether an agential explanation explains in virtue of referring to
an element of the ontology of the world.¹⁴ In an agential explanation, the system
itself is said to be the ‘cause’ of its own behavior; but what does ‘causation’mean
in this context?
A first safe observation is that the explanatory relation in agential explana-
tions does not explain by simply referring to a mechanism, or to any process of
causal production for that matter. There are clearly some causal processes caus-
ing the system’s change of state S1 → S2 (e.g., neurological processes causing be-
havioral change), but an agential explanation, at least as stated above, does not
explicitly refer to such causal processes. It explains the behavior in terms of a
purpose, and a condition linking that purpose to concrete conditions in reality
(i.e., S2). In this sense, an agential explanation cannot be viewed ontically in
the same way as a causal mechanical one (Craver 2014).
A second, relatively safe observation is that if the realization of P is ultimate-
ly a mathematical consequence of the structural set-up of a system, then there is
little reason to invoke ‘purposes’ and ‘agents’ as part of the ontology. For in-
stance, the minimization of potential energy is a mathematically deductive con-
sequence from the forces impinging on it as it rolls down the hill: there is no
need to invoke some ‘self-causation’ of the rolling ball. So, if one takes ‘self-cau-
 As shorthand, one can refer to this issue as the ‘ontology of agency’, but just for the sake of
clarity we emphasize that our approach to this issue in this paper is not directly metaphysical,
but is indirect, through analyzing how agential explanations should be interpreted.
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sation’ to be shorthand for a pattern of behavior that is a non-causal (whether
mathematical or structural) consequence of the causal set-up of the system
(e.g., approach to an attractor state), then ultimately agential explanation is a
non-causal explanation that identifies structural (or mathematical) consequen-
ces of how causal powers interact.
The Neo-Fisherian option largely follows this route,where organismic behav-
ior as analyzed along the lines of the ‘maximizing agent analogy’, where organ-
isms behave in such a way that maximizes their inclusive fitness. The underlying
assumption is called the “phenotypic gambit” (Grafen 1984, 2014), which holds
that the choice of a phenotype by the organism mirrors the allele dynamics that
underlie evolution. In this way, natural selection is taken to design organisms so
that they make decisions similar to what, as it were, natural selection would do
if it were making the decision.
So, it would seem that an ontic interpretation of agential explanation re-
quires a causal interpretation of agential explanation. This is indeed suggested
by the inclusion of ‘self-causation’ in the definition of agential explanation, al-
though the challenge for the Neo-Aristotelian option is then to specify how self-
causation should be interpreted.
While Walsh is unambiguous that agents should be included in an expand-
ed ontology (especially Walsh 2015: 211 ff.)¹⁵, it is in his account of natural pur-
poses that we can see how this is fleshed out.Walsh describes natural purposes
as “counterfactually robust difference makers” where purpose and means are
related by invariance relations (Walsh 2015: 198) in much the same way that
cause and effect are related by invariance relations in Woodward’s intervention-
ist account of causation (Woodward 2003). Explaining a behavior as purposive
involves identifying the disposition of “conducing” (Walsh 2015: 199), analogous
to how mechanistic explanation (sensu Glennan 2002 or Machamer et al. 2000)
involves identifying the dispositions of pushing or pulling (Walsh 2015: 198).
Even though Walsh does not describe such relations as ‘causal’¹⁶, the account
clearly involves some notion of causal difference-making where, moreover, ex-
planations involving natural purposes are interpreted ontically.
 In particular, it is implied if one adopts a Gibsonian view of the environment as a set of af-
fordances proper to a species or subspecies of organism (Gibson 1979 [2014]). These affordances
refer to the potential actions of an organism in an environment (e.g. running, jumping, eating,
sleeping, etc.) that are jointly determined by the environment and the purposes of an agent.
Moreover, these affordances in turn dispose the agent to act in certain ways.
 In fact, at one point he emphasizes that teleological explanations are not a species of causal
explanations (Walsh 2015: 196). However, here we read him as having in mind a concept of caus-
al production.
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Beyond a reluctance to expand fundamental ontology beyond what is strictly
necessary, we would like to point to two reasons for being dissatisfied with the
pure Neo-Aristotelian option. First, while we argued that an ontic interpretation
of agential explanation should attribute some causal reality to agency, when
this entails broadening the concept of causation, it becomes less clear what pre-
cisely is gained by an expanded Neo-Aristotelian ontology. Can robust patterns
of counterfactual dependence be objectively judged to be causal or non-causal?
This is notoriously dependent on the concept of causation one uses: once the
concept is broadened enough, then any counterfactual or even counterpossible
proposition will appear as causal (Huneman 2010). After all, if the agent with
purpose P were modified to an agent with purpose P’, then the observed behav-
ior would be (much) less likely, and this is sufficient to count as a causal relation
for some accounts of causation. This raises the question: if agential explanation
ultimately boils down to patterns of counterfactual relations, why does it matter
if one interprets agential explanation ontically?
Second, pragmatic factors complicate the ontic interpretation of agential ex-
planation. An agential explanation entails some counterfactual relation between
explanans (agent, purpose P) and explanandum (behavior); however, both a par-
ticular explanandum behavior as well as the agent’s purpose P can be described
at finer and coarser grains. Depending on the granularity with which explanan-
dum/explanans is described, the causal character of the corresponding explan-
atory relation changes (for an argument, see Desmond 2019). If agential expla-
nation is to be viewed ontically, and thus as explanatory in virtue of picking
out some self-causing capacity of an organism, one would not want this causal
character to disappear merely due to pragmatic factors, such as the grain at
which explanandum/explanans is described.
Can Agency Be Dispensed with?
While we do not pretend to have given any direct argument against the ontic in-
terpretation of agential explanation, we do hope to have clarified how the ontic
interpretation will lead to a host of problems, some of which are perhaps insu-
perable. However, we now want to turn our attention to the other side of the
coin: explanatory dispensability. The strongest argument in favor of a non-
ontic conception of agential explanation is that agency is dispensable (this is
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Ockham’s razor).¹⁷ We will illustrate in this section how it is misguided to believe
that organismic agency has been dispensed with in science. Whether science
may be able to dispense with agency in the future is a whole other question.
What we wish to show is a more limited point: given a pessimistic meta-induc-
tion on attempts to dispense with agency, there are at least good grounds to be-
lieve that science will not be able to dispense with agency. This will lay the
ground for the Kantian approach, which uniquely combines two positions: agen-
cy is indispensable (for scientific reasons), but agential explanations should not
be conceived ontically.
Many phenomena clearly do not ask for agential explanations. If a tree
branch cracks and falls to the ground during a storm, and we seek to explain
the change in the tree’s state, we spontaneously tend not to appeal to any
type of ‘agency’ of the tree. A property of the tree as a whole could be explana-
torily relevant – for example, a disposition such as brittleness could be referred
to in order to explain why oaks tend to crack more than willows during storms.
Nonetheless, we tend not to explain this tree ‘behavior’ in terms of the purposes
of the tree. Rather, given certain forces created by the wind, and perhaps given
certain structural properties of the tree, the outcome of the branch cracking was
determined. No agency is involved.
Even if extremal explanations were to be used, no agency would be required.
Classical mechanics provides a perfect example of how extremal explanations
exist alongside causal-mechanical explanations. Newtonian analyses of the be-
havior of masses, in terms of a mechanistic account of the continued action of
local forces, can always be rephrased with the Principle of Least Action (through
the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian formalism), which abstracts away from a great
number of degrees of freedom in a system, and instead ascribes a certain scalar
(i.e., the ‘action’ S) to a system. The behavior of the system is then the behavior
that maximizes or minimizes the action (cf. Coopersmith 2017).¹⁸
When a system has an extremely large number of degrees of freedom (~1023),
a different type of extremal explanation is needed, but even here the explanation
remains non-agential. Consider a generic thermodynamic phenomenon, such as
 Going in the other direction, from indispensability to a realist interpretation of a concept, is
more controversial but has of course been widely explored since Quine and Putnam.
 Historically, such non-agential extremal explanations are exactly what Leibniz had in mind,
when he stated that each mechanistic explanation, given in terms of the differential equations
governing the trajectories of the parts, could be reformulated in terms of final causes (Discours
de métaphysique § 13 (Leibniz, 1890)). As a further aside, even though such final causes were
dispensable for Leibniz, explanations involving them were to be preferred because they were
the most conducive to theology and were compatible with God’s moral maxims.
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the flow of heat from hot to cold. In statistical-mechanical analysis, the mole-
cules in a gas or liquid fluctuate randomly, but after some time, it is likely
that the faster-moving molecules will not remain bunched up in one area of
the container (i.e., the ‘hot’ area), but will spread out over the whole container,
either by diffusion or by transferring momentum to slower-moving molecules
through collisions.
This type of explanation, first introduced by Boltzmann, is non-causal in the
sense that it relies only on principles of combinatorics together with some boun-
dary conditions. A uniform temperature is a vastly more likely outcome than any
other since it corresponds to a much greater number of possible microstates, or
ways of distributing molecular speeds among the molecules in the container.
Erwin Schrödinger aptly named this type of extremal explanation, the ‘method
of the most probable distribution’ (Schrödinger [1946] 2013).
This type of extremal explanation has been widely applied to more complex
systems, including open systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium
(‘dissipative systems’). Ilya Prigogine, a pioneer in this field, proposed the prin-
ciple of minimal entropy production: i.e., systems in far-from-equilibrium condi-
tions organize themselves so as to minimize the increase of entropy (Prigogine
1947). However, universal extremal principles that govern the behavior of all dis-
sipative systems have not been found. For instance, the principle of maximal en-
tropy production has also been proposed (Paltridge 1979). It remains unclear to
what extent these extremal principles are instances of the method of the most
probable distribution – or whether they bring goals and purposes to the table
that cannot be explained through statistics alone.
When we look at more recent applications of statistical physics, gradual
progress can be discerned. For instance, an upper bound on the rate of bacterial
replication has been proposed (England 2013). However, this remains a research
program, and while there is not yet any clear reason why the program cannot
continue to make gradual progress, the prospect of reducing organismic behavior
to statistical physics remains remote.
When one departs from the reductive rigor of statistical physics, then axio-
matic thermodynamic extremal principles can seemingly be used to explain an-
imal behavior (and human behavior in particular). The work of Karl Friston,
which has enjoyed success in theoretical neuroscience, is an example of this ap-
proach. Here animal behavior is analyzed as minimizing free energy – intuitively,
this means that organisms minimize the quantity of ‘surprise’ in their environ-
ment (Friston 2010). However, free energy minimization is taken as axiomatic
and is not given a deeper derivation in the way Boltzmann had done for entropy
maximization in the context of equilibrium thermodynamics. In this way, it
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seems that the concept of ‘organismic purpose’ (in this case, the purpose of min-
imizing free energy) cannot be dispensed with within Friston’s framework.
We have discussed two types of non-agential extremal explanations – causal
mechanical ones, and non-causal statistical ones – and argued that both fail to
dispense with organismic agency. We would now like to consider in more detail
what is perhaps the most serious contender for dispensing with organismic agen-
cy, namely selectionist explanations. To what extent selectionist explanations re-
duce to non-causal statistical ones remains controversial. Some have argued that
they do: evolution caused by fitness differences is structurally identical to, for
instance, the differential growth rates of bank accounts with different interest
rates (Matthen and Ariew 2002; Walsh, Lewens, and Ariew 2002).
Regardless of the interpretation of natural selection, it is clear how it should
be combined with causal-mechanical explanation so as to seem to dispense with
agency. Consider the behavior of chemotaxis, where bacteria swim up sucrose
gradients. An agential explanation of this behavior would refer to the purpose
of the bacteria to get nutrition. However, one could attempt to explain chemotax-
is by referring to how, given a certain environmental input into the mechanism of
chemotaxis, a certain output (swimming behavior) is to be expected. And why is
the mechanism of chemotaxis set up in this particular way (connecting these in-
puts with those outputs)? Here the selectionist explanation comes in: those bac-
teria that came up with the mechanism of chemotaxis were able to take distance
from competitors and maximize their access to resources (Wei et al. 2011). This in
turn allowed them to reproduce more, eventually crowding out the bacteria inca-
pable of chemotaxis. There is no need to reference agency here.
Can agential explanation be reduced to selectionist explanation in this
way? We will not take a stand on whether it can or not ; however, we would
like to argue that this issue is considerably more complicated than the simple
selectionist-mechanical explanation above suggests. A selectionist explanation
may be adequate for chemotaxis, but it is far from clear that this can be gener-
alized to organismic behavior in general, especially concerning cases where or-
ganisms produce adaptive behavior even in novel environments.
To see this, recall that a selectionist explanation requires a homogeneous se-
lective environment (Brandon 1990), which means that selection pressures must
be relatively uniform across the environment. So, if an organism is exposed to a
‘novel’ selective environment, this means that it is exposed to selection pres-
sures that the organism’s ancestors never encountered. One of two scenarios
then presents itself. The first is that the fitness-maximizing analogy breaks
down: the organism sticks to its behavior that was previously adaptive, but mal-
adaptive in the new environment. The second is that the fitness-maximizing
analogy holds, and the organism chooses a new behavior that maximizes its (in-
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clusive) fitness. However, in this case, referring merely to a selectively-deter-
mined function cannot explain why the new behavior was chosen. In other
words, a mere selectionist explanation is not adequate.
To give this line of thought some more systematic detail: assume that organ-
ism O’s behavior B was selected for in selective environment E. Furthermore, B is
the output of some heritable function F.What if the environment shifts to some
radically different E*? Different organisms will behave differently, depending on
F. Some will continue producing B regardless; others will be sensitive to cues in
the environment, and the function F will produce as output B* instead of B (this
is behavioral plasticity). If B* turns out to be adaptive to E*, is this not a lucky
coincidence assuming that O’s ancestors never encountered the selection pres-
sures in E*? In other words, if F is designed for E, is it not a lucky coincidence
that F should also produce adaptive behavior in a radically different environ-
ment? This is how organismic purposes and agency can be introduced, to pro-
vide a better explanation of the production of adaptive behavior in novel envi-
ronments.
Of course, plasticity itself can be selected for (Bradshaw 1965), and this is
where the problem gets complex and interesting. So, if F underlies a plastic
trait that is modulated to produce adaptive behavior in E*, the selectionist
could respond that the appropriate explanation is not an agential explanation,
but rather that E* and E are simply not two different selective environments.
They may be different physical environments, but they are instances of the
same selective environment – for instance, they may be similar instantiations
of the same pattern of heterogeneity, such as possessing the same varying cues.
In this way, the question of whether agential explanations can be reduced to
selectionist explanations opens up to a large and fundamental problem of what
selective environments are and how they should be delineated. For this reason,
we do not wish to take a stand on whether agential explanations can be reduced
to selective explanations. A safer conclusion we would like to draw is this: it is
currently unclear whether agential explanations can be reduced to selectionist
explanations, and therefore we should not assume that the theory of natural se-
lection easily dispenses with agency. We should take seriously the option that
agency may be indispensable.
4 The Kantian Approach to Purposiveness
Kant’s work on teleology can offer an interesting perspective in that he consid-
ered a closely related problem – apparently incompatible ways of viewing bio-
logical organisms – but resolved it in a way that cuts across the dichotomy
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that pairs the indispensability of agency with an ontic view of agential explana-
tion. Most interest in the Kantian perspective on teleology has focused on devel-
opmental phenomena.¹⁹ A passage that is often quoted as particularly relevant is
the following where Kant introduces the term ‘self-organization’:
In such a product of nature each part is conceived as if it exists only through all the others,
thus as if existing for the sake of the others and on account of the whole, i.e., as an instru-
ment (organ), which is, however, not sufficient (for it could also be an instrument of art,
and thus represented as possible at all only as a purpose); rather it must be thought of
as an organ that produces the other parts (consequently each produces the others recipro-
cally), which cannot be the case in any instrument of art, but only of nature,which provides
all the matter for instruments (even those of art): only then and on that account can such a
product, as an organized and self-organizing being, be called a natural purpose. (Original
emphasis; translation slightly modified. Kant [1790] 2001, 274; 5:374)
What Kant is arguing here is that organisms are not simply machines (e.g., arti-
facts), where each part may be designed to contribute to the whole, but where
some external source (e.g., the artisan) is the cause of the production and main-
tenance of each part of the machine. Thus, for instance, the minute hand of a
watch is produced by the artisan and not by any other part of the watch. By con-
trast, the various anatomical and physiological traits of an organism are pro-
duced by processes internal to the organism. Organisms are thus not to be judged
as machines: an essential property of organisms is that the parts also cause the
production and maintenance of the other parts, as we see in the ontogenesis.
In this way, the passage in which Kant introduces the notion of self-organi-
zation is most directly relevant to issues concerning the development of organ-
isms; not surprisingly this is where the connection between contemporary biol-
ogy and Kant’s thought has most often been made (see also Huneman 2017).
Here however, we would like to draw out more explicitly the implications of
this for organismic behavior and organismic agency.²⁰ In particular, we will
look in more detail at Kant’s general idea of purposiveness, and at his general
 For a discussion of these different perspectives, and the relevance of the Kantian approach to
contemporary debates in evolutionary biology, see Huneman 2017. See also references to Kant in
Varela 1979, Kauffman 1993.
 To a certain extent, the division between development and behavior is artificial. Develop-
ment typically refers to morphological changes (cell differentiation, growth, etc.) that are rela-
tively irreversible and slow in comparison to physiological changes (metabolism) or behavioral
changes (movement through space). Some explicitly distinguish between development and be-
havior (e.g. Burge 2009); by contrast, most behavioral ecologists consider any trait (for instance
a tree growing small vs. large leaves) as a ‘behavior’.
The Ontology of Organismic Agency: A Kantian Approach 51
treatment of the antinomy of teleological judgment, which concerns the apparent
clash between ‘mechanistic’ and ‘teleological’ approaches to the organism.
4.1 The Antinomy of Teleological Judgment
In his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant posits the following two conflict-
ing maxims concerning ‘generation’ (a contemporary close-equivalent: develop-
ment) and ‘mechanical laws’ (namely, laws that govern the way parts yield
wholes – see McLaughlin 1990):
Thesis: All generation of material things is possible in accordance with mere-
ly mechanical laws.
Antithesis: Some generation of such things is not possible in accordance
with merely mechanical laws. (Kant [1790] 2001, 258–259; 5:387).
In particular, Kant had biological organisms in mind as possible entities that
are not generated merely according to mechanical laws. This thesis-antithesis
pair is simply a contradiction, leading to mutually incompatible views with no
prospect of reconciliation.
Kant’s first step, then, is to make explicit that such pronouncements about
the nature of reality are actually judgments that are necessarily relative to our
cognition of reality. Hence, he proposes the following thesis-antithesis pair:
The first maxim of the power of judgement is the thesis: All generation of material things
and their forms must be judged as possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws.
The second maxim is the antithesis: Some products of material nature cannot be judged as
possible according to merely mechanical laws (judging them requires an entirely different
law of causality, namely that of final causes). (Kant [1790] 2001, 258–259; 5:387)
This is the antinomy of teleological judgment. The motivation underlying the an-
tithesis draws on the idea that mechanical laws do not seem to adequately ac-
count for the organization that can be found in biological organisms. In partic-
ular, Kant writes:
Nature, considered as a mere mechanism, could have formed itself in a thou-
sand different ways without hitting precisely upon the unity (KU, AA, V: 360).
The mechanical laws do not privilege any particular organization over an-
other; hence, if the organization were to be explained with merely mechanical
laws, the organization of organisms could only be judged to be the result of
chance (see Huneman 2006).
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4.2 Contingency and Kant’s Concept of Purposiveness
In this way, Kant is relying on a concept of purposiveness that can be described
as the ‘lawfulness of the contingent as such’ (First Introduction to the Critique of
Judgement, Kant [1790] 2001, 20; 20:217). An initial illustration of the concept can
be given in the context of development. For instance, if one were only to take the
mechanical laws of nature into account, the fact that the development of a chick-
en leads to a chicken appears to be contingent – once the initial and boundary
conditions are sufficiently changed, it might develop into a monster. However,
the laws themselves cannot explain this wide divergence in outcome, since in
both cases the same laws apply. One must introduce the idea that the develop-
ment is the development of a chicken, and therefore is oriented towards this goal.
Thus, such an idea brings some necessity into a process that is, with regard to
nature itself (i.e., the mechanical laws of nature), contingent. The same goes
for the functions of organisms: whether or not an elephant’s lungs breathe
seems highly contingent if one only takes into account the laws of nature, but
appears as necessary when we introduce the idea that breathing is the function
of the lung. This entails invoking the idea of a functioning organism. Thus, bio-
logical functions and embryogenic development instantiate the same epistemic
pattern (Huneman 2006).
Kant’s theory of purposiveness is intended to reflect this epistemic fact. To
introduce it, he gives a famous example: what if one were to come across a reg-
ular hexagon drawn in the sand (Kant [1790] 2001 §62)?²¹ This, says Kant, can
only be understood as an instance of purposiveness, because if we do not
posit a concept (‘regular hexagon’) that is ‘at the basis of ’ (i.e., guided) its pro-
duction,we cannot understand why it is drawn in the sand. In other words,while
the laws of nature can lead to the appearance of all sorts of figures in the sand,
the specific kind of figure we see is not privileged by those laws (i.e., it is not any
more probable than any other kind of figure).When we see a physical instance of
a regular hexagon then, and we judge that it fits the concept of a ‘regular hexa-
gon’, there is no indication in the laws of nature as to why a regular hexagon
should be produced rather than another one. Hence, we reasonably assume
that the concept ‘regular hexagon’ was at the basis of its production – namely,
someone thought of this concept and has drawn the hexagon – and thereby
 Note that Kant chose an example from mathematics as part of his overall strategy to decou-
ple the notion of purposiveness he intends to capture from the usual scheme of craftsmanship,
fabrication, etc.
The Ontology of Organismic Agency: A Kantian Approach 53
the contingent figure we see on the sand features some lawlikeness (since it has
been drawn according to some rule).
To put the argument in a more contemporary idiom, consider the following.
Among the set of all possible hexagons, the size of the subset of regular hexa-
gons (i.e., with equal sides) is extremely small (measure = 0). Hence, given
that we observe a regular hexagon, and that the probability that a process gov-
erned only by mechanical laws of motion would cause a regular hexagon to ap-
pear is 0, appealing to the presence of a concept at the ground of the production
allows for a (much) better explanation of the appearance of the hexagon.
This same line of reasoning can be applied to organisms. In Kant’s Unique
Argument for a proof of God’s existence, the first major text in which he deals
with life and finality, he considers the traditional example of the eye, describing
the example in the following way: in an eye there are many parts, each following
different and mutually independent laws, and yet, the parts function not only in
such a way that the eye can see, but if we were to even slightly change the struc-
ture or behavior of one of the parts, the eye as a whole would no longer achieve
sight. Similarly, in the third Critique Kant gives the example of the bird whose
different anatomical parts seem to be organized in very specific ways in order
to enable flight: “the structure of a bird, the hollowness of its bones, the place-
ment of its wings for movement and of its tail for steering, etc.” (Kant [1790]
2001, 233; 5:360). And yet, it remains possible also to view an organism as a
clump of dead matter, obeying the laws of mechanics. The price to pay for the
latter possibility is that there is no longer any answer to the question of why
those parts are so contrived – to use a word that will become crucial for Darwin –
to allow flight.²²
The notion of purposiveness as elaborated by Kant is closely related to ex-
tremal explanations. Consider the evolution of the camera eye, and its depend-
ence on the laws of nature (and causal-mechanical processes). Assume we can
vary the laws of nature (and causal-mechanical processes) by manipulating a pa-
rameter vector {(Ai)}, and let some scalar variable W represent the functional
 Note that the judgment that there is a causal relation between two objects or events (like two
billiard balls colliding) is a constitutive use of reason (understanding), whereas judging accord-
ing to mechanical laws is a regulative use of reason, even though mechanical laws are clearly
closely related to causality as an a priori principle. But, as said before, mechanism is about
the relation between parts and wholes – knowing wholes from the parts – while causation is
about the succession of events or facts. Disentangling how precisely Kant understood the rela-
tion between causality and mechanical laws is the subject of some debate in Kant scholarship.
See, for example, Allison 2001.
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value of the eye (for instance, the representational accuracy²³ of its images). Fur-
ther assume that a particular set of parameter values (A1, A2… An) maps onto the
extreme value W0 for W – namely, the best functionality or representational val-
idity – and let W0 also be the precise value that W assumes in empirical nature.
Yet, it would seem highly improbable that the parameter vector should attain the
exact (A1, A2… An) among all possible values of {(Ai)}; correspondingly, function-
al sight seems highly improbable. Referring to the concept of ‘sight’ as a concept
that somehow guides the fixation of the parameter values (A1, A2… An) allows
one to ascribe a kind of necessity (or at least a much higher probability) to
(A1, A2… An). Thus, interpreting W0 as the purpose of ‘sight’, allows for the ex-
planation of why sight-enabling structures emerged.
So,when Kant holds here that the fact that (A1, A2… An) obtains is not explain-
able except if one thinks of a concept (‘sight’) at its ground, this account is per-
fectly analyzable as positing an extremal explanation which explains the explan-
andum as the extremal value (in turn corresponding to functional sight) of a
mathematical function. Thus, the reason why the vector (A1, A2… An) – otherwise
wholly contingent – is the one that we find in nature is that the vector realizes
some extremum. Moreover, the concept of vision ultimately appeals to the idea of
a functioning organism that is able to survive (e.g. catch prey, avoid predators,
track motions and light in its environment, etc.). In this way, the reference to the
concept of vision introduces lawlikeness into the contingent unity of mechanical
laws involved in the design of the eye.
The lawfulness of this contingent unity, i.e., the notion of purposiveness, is
for Kant only a regulative and not a constitutive concept or principle. Regulative
and constitutive principles refer to two uses of reason. While not going into too
much detail,²⁴ the latter refer to the synthetic a priori principles (causality, per-
manence, reciprocal action, etc.) that ground any science of nature, and when
events or facts can be subsumed under such principles, they can be considered
as ‘objective’. By contrast, in the regulative use of reason, the principles inform
our cognition of the objects and allow for knowledge of objects, but do not posit
anything as objective. An instance of the “regulative use” of ideas of reason, de-
scribed in the Dialectic or the Critique of Pure Reason, involves prescribing the
idea of the “synthesis of all conditions” to the world. This allows us to require
new conditions for the conditioned events, empirical laws, forces or facts we
have found. Nonetheless, we cannot posit as objective the whole of conditions –
 See Burge (2009) on veridicality as a norm for representational systems. Burge’s notion of
norm is here accounted for in terms of extremal value.
 For an introduction see Huneman 2007.
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which Kant calls the “unconditioned” and which can refer to, for instance, the
whole world, or God (which in turn refers to what Kant calls “Ideas of reason”²⁵).
Likewise, the idea that each individual belongs to a species that in turn belongs
to a higher order class (family, genus, etc.) is not an objective fact, but a regula-
tive principle of our knowledge,without which we would be unable to cognize an
ordered world.
The regulative principles that allow for biology (since, at least as stated in
the third Critique, the constitutive principles of judgment lead to viewing the
contingent as simply contingent and lawful) are precisely the lawlikeness of
the contingent as purposive: this kind of lawlikeness implies, as we said, the
idea of a functional or developing organism. Moreover, from the moment the ref-
erence to such totality – namely, the organism – is introduced, a new level of
necessity is brought into a set of facts and events that would otherwise appear
wholly contingent. This then allows these facts to be studied in a scientific man-
ner: biologists will ask which mechanisms fulfill this or that function, or what
processes lead to the formation of such and such an organ and then the
whole organism. Inversely, any such scientific enquiry already assumes the law-
likeness of the contingent.
5 Organismic Agency and the Demand of Reason
We will now depart from a description of Kant’s framework, and draw out the
(Kantian) implications of the concept of purposiveness for the central issue of
this paper, namely the ontology and dispensability of agency. In particular, we
will argue against three ways of viewing agency: first the position that agency
is a mere projection (non-ontic, dispensable); second that it refers to an element
of objective nature (ontic, indispensable); finally, we will also contrast the Kant-
ian view with the position that agency is a mere heuristic, but that it is indispen-
sable given our evolved nature and limited computational capacity. This is a view
where agential explanation is viewed as non-ontic, and agency as dispensable
for cognition of reality, but indispensable for the human cognition of reality.
First, can purposiveness be seen as a projection of the human mind onto the
natural world? In this view, goals and functions are in fact anthropomorphic pro-
jections onto the world (e.g., Lewens 2007: 544–5). Such projections may serve
some purpose as heuristics, but they do not reveal anything objectively real
 On this notion see Allison 2001, Grier 1995.
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about the world and are entirely dispensable: they are to be replaced by mech-
anistic or law-based explanations whenever the latter become available.
In response, recall from the previous section how, in a Kantian framework,
the question whether or not agential explanation should be viewed ontically is
bound up with the distinction between ‘regulative’ and ‘constitutive’ principles.
Only the latter give rise to ontic explanations; nonetheless, that does not mean
that purposiveness is merely a projection of the human mind onto the natural
world. Granted, purposiveness does not constitute nature as such and is there-
fore not objective in the same way that laws of nature are. However, they are
not a ‘projection’ in the sense that it is an optional way for a cognizing subject
to see the world. Once biological items are the object of a quest for knowledge,
there is no alternative to purposiveness for the faculty of knowledge.
This can be emphasized by referring to one last element in Kant’s work,
namely how the structure of the faculty of knowledge is ‘finite’:
Absolutely no human reason (or even any finite reason that is similar to ours in quality, no
matter how much it exceeds it in degree) can ever hope to understand the generation of even
a little blade of grass from merely mechanical causes. (our emphasis, Kant [1790] 2001, 279;
5:410)
Our reason is ‘finite’ because it cannot derive intuitions from concepts, and
therefore, the particular from the universal.²⁶ An ‘infinite’ reason, by contrast,
would not be limited in this way. However, Kant does not posit that such an in-
finite reason actually exists, or for that matter, is even possible under some
counterfactual scenario. Instead, it is a mere idea that orients philosophical en-
quiry into knowledge, or if you will, a thought experiment aimed at clarifying
what reason is. This distinction between finite and infinite reason can be con-
nected to two modes of understanding: discursive and intuitive understanding.
Intuitive understanding (which, like infinite reason, is a mere idea that orients
the philosophical enquiry about knowledge) would be able to cognize the partic-
ular instances of concept X at the same time it cognizes the (universal) concept
of X. By contrast, discursive understanding must go through ‘mediations’ in
order to arrive at the particular. Simple acts of observation can be such media-
tions (to check whether anything corresponds to the concept X).
The concept of purposiveness is also such a mediation, since it allows rea-
son to proceed from the universal laws of nature to particular organisms. A living
being can, in general, be analyzed by means of mechanistic laws, e.g., the uni-
 Concepts allow us access to the universal, while intuitions provide us access to the particu-
lar.
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versal laws governing the dynamics of each part. However, here only a very spe-
cific combination of the part-level processes results in a living being (think of the
various laws involved in the building of the eye, mentioned above). Hence, the
finite reason has to shift to the level of the “lawlikeness of the contingent as
such”, namely, to assume the regulative principle of purposiveness by introduc-
ing the reference to the whole organism. This “idea of the whole,” he says in § 65,
is only a principle of cognition, not of production.
This finiteness of reason leads to what Kant in other passages describes as a
‘demand’ of reason for the ‘unconditioned’. We previously described it as the
‘synthesis of all conditions’, but in a more contemporary idiom, it could also
be described as the following:
The demand for the unconditioned is essentially a demand for ultimate explanation, and
links up with the rational prescription to secure systematic unity and completeness of
knowledge. Reason, in short, is in the business of ultimately accounting for all things. (…)
the demand for the unconditioned is inherent in the very nature of our reason, [and] is un-
avoidable and indispensably necessary… (Grier 2018)
Kant thus takes this demand of reason to deliver a kind of impossibility result for
the possibility of a non-purposive explanation of organismic development (and
by extension, the same could be said of organismic agential-like behavior).
In this way, in contrast to interpreting agential explanations as involving an-
thropomorphic projection, for the ‘Kantian option’ there is no alternative to ex-
plaining organismic behavior as agential. Moreover, seeing an organism as an
agent is even a precondition (the transcendental ground) to being able to
make a projection onto a natural system. For instance, if in some agential expla-
nation, a repertoire of actions is projected onto a living organism, this presup-
poses seeing an organism as an agent. Assuming agency makes ascribing empir-
ical methodology and even (behavioral) property to organisms possible. This is
how the ‘indispensability’ implied by the Kantian option should be understood.
Others have taken the ‘blade of grass’ passage cited above as support for
an ontic view of agential explanation, where “organisms are subjects having pur-
poses according to values encountered in the making of their living” (Weber and
Varela 2002, 102). But an ontic interpretation of agential explanation – where or-
ganisms are (objectively) subjects with (objective) purposes – clashes with Kant’s
overarching transcendental framework, since only constitutive principles can
ground ontic explanations. Given that regulative principles such as purposive-
ness are a consequence of the finite nature of reason, they are not empirically
discoverable facts, but are instead presupposed in any epistemic strategy for
searching empirical truths. This shows how the Kantian option implies a non-
ontic view of agential explanation.
58 Hugh Desmond, Philippe Huneman
Does the Kantian option imply an epistemic view of agential explanation?
We take ‘epistemic’ here to refer to expectability sensu Salmon (Salmon 1989),
where an explanation explains in virtue of showing the explanandum as expect-
ed (i.e., with high probability). In this sense, the Kantian option does certainly
interpret agential explanations as showing how the explanandum is to be ex-
pected; however, much also depends on how ‘expectability’ is interpreted. Con-
sider the subjective interpretation²⁷, where expectability is analyzed as depend-
ent on the amount of information available to the subject; as the information
changes, so does the expectability. This is what is presupposed if one views
agential explanations as arising from bounded rationality, where agency is ascri-
bed as a heuristic or computational shortcut given time and/or information con-
straints. The Kantian option is not ‘epistemic’ in this way: it does not refer to
properties of what could be called ‘evolved human nature’ but rather to a funda-
mental structure of reason itself. Any finite reason, even if it would be as com-
putationally powerful as the largest supercomputer, would not be able to under-
stand organismic purposes only in terms of causal mechanisms. Even if our
empirical nature were very different – for instance, if we had evolved very differ-
ent cognitive heuristics for understanding the world – as long as we are endowed
with a finite reason then we would still employ teleological concepts such as
agency. Thus, agential explanations are non-ontic in the sense that agency as
a concept ultimately can be traced back to a fundamental structure of reason
(and not a structure of the objective world, nor to a quantity of information
about the world available to a subject).
In sum, the Kantian approach suggests that agential explanations are to be
viewed as non-ontic explanations but in which agency is indispensable.Viewing
organisms as agents is a heuristic – it allows organisms to be identified as
wholes in the first place (cf. Breitenbach 2008), and thereby allows a research
program about the mechanisms of functions and development – but it is not
merely a heuristic: it is unavoidable for a finitely rational understanding of na-
ture. Agential explanations may be predictive tools – they may accurately sum-
marize complex patterns of behavior and allow us to predict how organisms will
respond to environmental inputs – but they are more than mere predictive tools,
because if they were merely predictive tools, agential explanations would be re-
placeable by an explanation that integrates a mass of complex causal detail.
Even though the latter may be predictively equivalent or even superior to an
agential explanation, it does not afford understanding to rational beings.
 An objective interpretation seeks to analyze expectability (and probability) in terms of objec-
tive structures, and thus leads to a variation on the ontic view of agential explanation.
The Ontology of Organismic Agency: A Kantian Approach 59
6 Conclusion: Organismic Agency and the
Demand of Reason
The shift in contemporary biology towards the agential approach motivates pay-
ing closer philosophical attention to agential explanations. Yet agential explana-
tions are still today interpreted along the lines of a dichotomy between ontic/in-
dispensable or non-ontic/dispensable, even though both options are ultimately
unsatisfactory. In this paper we elucidated the Kantian option, where viewing or-
ganisms as agents is a demand of reason, and thus indispensable to our cogni-
tion of reality, but yet where agency is not added to the ‘furniture’ or basic on-
tology of the world.
This implies that agential explanations are unavoidable given our rational
nature. This goes further than merely stating that agential and non-agential ex-
planations are complementary.While it is of course possible also to view organ-
isms as combinations of mechanisms, scientists, as rational beings, have no
choice but to use agential explanations as well. Agency is thus not simply an in-
vestigative heuristic or a predictive tool that can be dispensed with once our sci-
entific knowledge is sufficiently advanced, like a ladder that is climbed only then
to be kicked away. Seeing agency in the natural world is not like a form of super-
stition that can be dispelled by the onward march of scientific reason; it is inher-
ent to reason itself and is therefore not a ladder that can ever be kicked away.
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